After gaining their membership in NATO, and especially after the big-bang EU enlargement of 2004, the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), used their political, diplomatic and economic resources to support the Western Balkans’ road into the EU-Atlantic organizations, as well as to strengthen their weak regional connections. Given their shared- but not entirely identical- historical path under socialism, followed by a period of transition, the Visegrad 4 can be perceived as a group of the most relevant European countries that can contribute to the overall process of Europeanization of the Balkans. Apparently, after the fall of the Eastern bloc, the V4 were the pioneers in the mission searching for a new identity, correlated with the European norms and values. Even though the Visegrad countries are prone to act as a group, not all of them are equally committed to the Western Balkans’ future in the European Union. In fact, the individual country’s role may vary in accordance to additional factors, such as the geographical position and geostrategic priorities, the country’s contemporary political objectives, the country’s position in the broad sphere of European politics and international relations, the position of minorities in the neighboring Western Balkan states (such as for example the Hungarian minority in Croatia and Serbia), etc.
The Visegrad group has supported the Western Balkan region through the International Visegrad Fund since 2004. The cooperation among the V4 and the Western Balkans intensified after 2011, as the regular meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs contributed to a regular exchange between officials from the regions. In 2012, the V4 countries, under the Polish presidency launched a new initiative V4—Western Balkans Expert Network on Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights. By granting expert advice, sharing experience and providing technical assistance on issues concerning the rule of law and fundamental rights, this network was created to support the WB integration in the EU. In addition, the V4-Western Balkan joint statement in 2014 cited to a number of examples of practical assistance that the V4 provided to the WB in the field of justice and rule of law, children rights, public administration reform, contributing to the fulfillment of criteria of the most crucial negotiation chapters: Chapters 23 of the EU Acquis: Judiciary and Fundamental Rights and Chapter 24: Justice, Freedom and Security.
The migration and refugee crises in 2015 brought the Western Balkans into the focus of the EU again. The migrants mostly originating from the Middle Eastern countries chose the so-called Balkan route, putting the Western Balkan countries and the stability of the whole region into a difficult situation. For that purpose, during the Czech Presidency of the V4, the interior ministers from the V4, Slovenia, Serbia, and Macedonia issued a Joint declaration on the future cooperation in order to enhance control over migration flows.
An important tool in the cooperation between the Visegrad Group and the Western Balkan countries is the Visegrad Fund in the Visegrad + Program. The V4 countries serve as a positive example for the WB countries, delivering the most important factors for the development of infrastructure, employment, the existence of medium and small companies, the development of the private sector, civil society, the regional and rural development, as well as the attempts to improve the professional educational, research and academic perspectives in the region. The V4 countries help the Western Balkans to find common, regional solutions regarding border management, the fight against corruption and organized crime, etc.
For the Visegrad framework, one of the most successful achievements was the establishment of the Western Balkans Fund, based in Tirana, Albania in order to assist smaller projects that contributed to the cooperation between civil society and state actors. Another form of cooperation (still ongoing) was established earlier with the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), based in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina initially termed as Stability Pact for Southeast Europe (SPSEE). The RCC and the V4 cooperation were supposed to be intensified through establishing a mutual standing Forum for Cooperation which would meet twice a year and gather policy makers, civil society and academia.
2019 is of great importance, bearing in mind that this summer, one of the Visegrad countries – Poland will host the fourth in a row conference of the Berlin process in the city of Poznan. The decision for Poland to host the Berlin process is an awkward moment, followed by contrasting views. From one hand, the involvement of Poland might bring the Berlin Process and the Visegrad Group closer to each other, resulting in greater cooperation in a long-run. This is an obvious scenario due to the fact that to a point, the Visegrad policies and the Berlin Process overlap. On the other hand, The Summit of Poznan is organized in a climate of uncertainty. Western Balkan enlargement into the EU may once again be put on hold because of the European Parliament elections, as well as the exclusion of the Western Balkans of the agenda of Sibiu Summit on the Future of Europe of May 2019, organized by the Romanian Presidency. This might be observed as a step back after the Sofia Summit in 2018, when during and thanks to the Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the EU, after the 15-year-gap since the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, the Western Balkans were one of the top priorities of the EU. Moreover, although Poland provides political and technical support for the EU reform process in the WB, at an internal level the country continuously struggles with problems concerning the rule of law, as it is currently being considered for sanctions under the Article 7 procedure from the EU. Hungarian Prime Minister Orban’s Fidesz party was also suspended from the Europe’s centre-right EPP. Nevertheless, the most controversial Visegrad member at the moment is Hungary and Orban’s trend of illiberal democracy, deeply infiltrated in the internal politics of Serbia and Montenegro, and previously in North Macedonia. The situation culminated in November 2018, when Orban granted political asylum to the former Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, who escaped the country after he was convicted for corruption and abuse of power.
However, Poland as a host is not the only odd moment in the Berlin process, bearing in mind the previous hosts and conferences. For example, the 2018 Western Balkan Summit in London, followed by deep inconsistency from organizational to structural and diplomatic point of view only “re-confirmed the fact that each hosting country tries to show its peculiarities, without prioritizing the Western Balkan region”.
Poland and Hungary, instead of encouraging and supporting political elites and civil society in the Western Balkans in order to jointly implement the necessary reforms, encourages the corrupt political elites to maintain in power and to manipulate their countries‘ political institutions. These trends diminish the Visegrad’s legitimacy as a promoter of change including in the WB. Despite V4 illiberal tendencies, the role of the Visegrad group can be strengthened by respecting and promoting the EU values, such as human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. By establishing a strong agenda the Visegrad countries can send a clear message, both to the Western Balkans and to the EU, that the Visegrad group can still serve as a good role model for the region’s enlargement in the Euro-Atlantic organizations.
In the end, whether Poland as this year’s host of the Berlin process will put efforts to connect the three concerned actors, who have somewhat different recent political histories but are striving for the same goal- European Union membership – can be emphasized after July 5. In 2019 the Visegrad countries are celebrating the 15th anniversary of their EU accession, and this can be used as a good political signal and inspiration for both WB societies and governments. In spite of everything, the Western Balkans can follow the positive example of the V4 creating a pragmatic and systematic structured dialogue, raising mutual confidence and building regional coexistence, as well as a strong regional identity.
0 comments