Bosnia and Herzegovina

ISIS (also known as ISIL, IS, or Daesh depending on who you ask) has recently popped up in all corners of the globe, not being contained in the territory it physically controls in Iraq and Syria. Its goal is to create a Caliphate, or khilafa, an Islamic state which holds religious authority over the entire global Islamic community, or the ummah. History has seen many such states since the start of Islam, each with their own different peculiarities depending on the historical and geopolitical context of the time. ISIS’s propaganda wing has gone in multiple directions, which range from portraying itself as an unstoppable force that must be feared to attempting to convince the ummah it is their obligation to make hijrah, or (in the ISIS context) a pilgrimage to the new self-proclaimed caliphate. All this has resulted in an influx of Muslims from around the world to the new Islamic State.

The beginning of the modern mujahedeen movement started when the Soviet Union and pro-USSR Afghanistan government were fighting against an Islamic insurgency from 1979 to 1989. Texas Congressman Charlie Wilson proposed helping the mujahedeen forces fight against the USSR, inspired directly by the foreign fighters in historical Battle of the Alamo. He spearheaded US support to the mujahedeen and covert US involvement in the Afghanistan conflict. The US provided assistance to leaders such as Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, who is known as the Father of the Global Jihad movement. Long before the US was fighting against this movement, Azzam toured the US selling “Help Free Afghanistan” T-shirts and held at least one bake sale in order to raise funds for the mujahedeen.

25 years ago, Azzam preached similar ideology to what ISIS does now. For Azzam, it was a fight against the godless communists who would impose their rule on Muslims in Afghanistan, and now ISIS is now preaching the same against the secular Syrian and Shia Iraqi regimes. Azzam’s appeals brought in never before seen waves of foreigners to help the mujahedeen fight. This also led to the construction of the wide networks and tactics that were to be used for years, in which Islamic NGOs and charities such as the Mu’assasat Al-Haramain al Khayriyya (Charitable Establishment of the Two Holy Mosques) were used as a front to help smuggle fighters and fund the fighting.

Mujahedeen in Afghanistan

Mujahideen in Afghanistan
Mujahideen in Afghanistan

After the conflict was over and the mujahedeen emerged victorious, Osama Bin Laden decided to continue the fight through creating a team of experienced fighters that would bring the mujahedeen to wherever Muslims were being attacked, using the newly formed Al Qaeda. Using the networks that had been established, Al Qaeda decided that the new battleground for its fight would be in Bosnia, whose conflict started within weeks of the fall of the Communist regime in Afghanistan. Not only did they have thousands of trained fighters looking to fight for the ummah, but this conflict also perfectly fit the frame that they had been using before; a Muslim population under attack from a communist regime. Other immediate areas of interest for the mujahedeen included Chechnya and the Philippines, but this article will focus on those that went off to fight in the Balkans.

The first wave of fighters in early 1992 was largely ineffective. They were idealists, looking to help a population under attack. The second wave, which came only months later, consisted of veterans of the Afghanistan conflict. They formed the El Mudžahid battalion where they provided much needed assistance to the newly established Bosnian state against the stronger forces of Yugoslavia, and Croatia. The mujahedeen’s guerilla experience also proved particularly valuable because of the stronger forces aligned against the Bosnians.

Though in theory the mujahedeen were subordinate to the Bosnian army, the mujahedeen often took orders directly from their own religious authorities, some of which even expressed desire to start a caliphate in Bosnia instead of fighting for a Bosnian state.

While the mujahedeen in Bosnia were effective and did greatly help the Bosnian armed forces, they also caused problems. They saw themselves as warriors of god, not warriors of Bosnia, and so they clashed with the locals. For example, they did not approve of the fact that Bosniaks drank alcohol and danced. Though in theory the mujahedeen were subordinate to the Bosnian army, the mujahedeen often took orders directly from their own religious authorities, some of which even expressed desire of starting a caliphate in Bosnia instead of fighting for a Bosnian state.

Interestingly enough, this conflict brought in foreign fighters from all over the world. Because of its history, it can be seen as a ‘clash of civilizations’. The Ottoman legacy in Bosnia brought in Islamic fighters, while the Catholic Austro-Hungarian legacy brought in fighters from Catholic and Protestant nations alike, and Eastern Orthodoxy in Serbia brought in volunteers from other Orthodox states, most notably Russia. This has replayed itself in the makeup of foreign fighters in Ukraine, with a similar Christian East/West split in foreign fighters. Serbians have gone to fight with the pro-Russian forces (some of which have cited previous support during the Yugoslav wars as a motivation) and Croatians have fought with the Ukrainian government. It should be noted that this was not the first experience the Balkans had with foreign fighters. During the Greek war of independence, many European intellectuals came to help the Greeks, most notably the British poet Lord Byron. Later on during the Spanish Civil War, the Dimitrov Battalion and Đaković Battalion took in many Balkan leftists as an effort to organize Internationalists by origins.

After the Bosnian war ended, the Dayton agreement required the removal of the Mujahedeen. However, many stayed, received citizenship, and married local women. After 9/11, there have been attempts to deport them from Bosnia as an attempt to remove a potential European base for terrorism, which were largely successful.

After the Bosnian conflict, many mujahedeen went to Kosovo, where the Kosovo Liberation Army had been fighting against Yugoslavia for years. The Al Qaeda tactic of exploiting conflicts with Muslim actors led them to entering Kosovo before the fighting was significant enough to draw international attention. Following this, the mujahedeen were able to go into Macedonia where they assisted the National Liberation Army along with other Albanians living both in Macedonia and from the region.

The foreign fighter phenomenon in the Kosovo and Macedonia conflicts have been poorly recorded compared to other conflicts. Much like in Bosnia and Afghanistan before it, the mujahedeen often clashed with locals over religious issues. Like in Bosnia, the local fighters of Kosovo and Macedonia were all interested in ethnic liberation, not the ideology of fundamental Islam that the mujahedeen came to fight for. Many of the fighters stayed after the conflicts were over, while others left to further their dream of global Islamic conquest. Shortly after the end of the Macedonian conflict, the September 11th attacks occurred, which created a split in the mujahedeen in which many Western fighters had to decide their allegiances.

During pre-September 11th conflicts, there were American and European Muslims who fought with the mujahedeen and returned home without seeing a contradiction with their two identities. When discussed in Jihadist ideology, this is because it is considered honorable to defend Muslims under attack in traditional Islamic lands, while there is questionable legitimacy over attacking non-Muslims in foreign lands. Many moderate Jihadist groups are focused on defending Muslims, while many of the more radical groups don’t agree with attacking non-Muslims in faraway lands.

The end of conflicts in the region did not end the influx of radical Islam into the region. The instability left in the region after all of these conflicts has made it easy prey for Islamic groups and humanitarian agencies with alternative motives. Even though the Muslim population in the region has been traditionally moderate, rich Salafi groups such as the ‘Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo and Chechnya’ that shares the ideology of groups such as Al Qaeda have funded mosques and madrasas (Islamic schools) in the region, many of which have been built illegally. One such example is the Society of the Revival of Islamic Heritage, which the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated as “providing financial and material support to Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda affiliates” and had been acting in Kosovo for years before it was outed as a terrorist funding organization. For a detailed article on the Salafi influence on the Balkans, see “Radical route – Salafism in the Balkans” by Dimal Basha and Dr. Jana Arsovska.

Occasional incidents bring up the painful past. In 2002, seven men were killed in Macedonia following a gun battle with police. The men, all Pakistani, were accused of being part of the NLA and mujahedeen who were planning on attacking embassies around the country. However, this narrative was heavily questioned, and some members of the government said that it was a staged shooting to make Macedonia look like a victim in the eyes of the international community. Similar counter-narratives have been heard in this year’s gun battle in Kumanovo (which consisted of Kosovar Albanians rather than Macedonian Albanians) such as the attacks being part of a government attempt to distract the country from the current political crisis, or an attempt to punish Macedonia for opposing sanctions against Russian, a theory championed by Russians such as Sergey Lavrov.

With the history of the region in mind, it is not unlikely that such incidents are simply as they appear to be. Throughout history, many armed groups have stayed together after the conflict they fought in ended. Even if an armed group dissolves, the networks and individuals with experience remain. Especially when it comes to a group such as ISIS which is the culmination of years of a violent movement, these networks and histories can have a major effect on how the conflict plays out and how relevant actors react. Such networks allow for everything from recruitment (communication with former mujahedeen is one of the most effective recruiting tools for foreign fighter movements), to hideouts, to access for smugglers or those in transit. These networks have led to the creation of training camps, which have been found in both Albania and Bosnia.

The Balkans’ unique history as one of the only two regions of Europe to have been under Islamic rule (under the Ottoman Caliphate) directly relates to the ideology of ISIS, which is trying to establish itself as a modern caliphate. Five centuries of Ottoman rule over the region resulted in mass religious conversions, most notably in the Bosnian and Albanian populations, but also in the Roma population and in small minorities of Christian populations, such as in Serbia and Bulgaria. Rough estimates give a total of nine million Muslims throughout the Balkans, which is a small percentage of the global Muslim population, but still cannot be ignored by ISIS if it wants to be perceived as the voice of the ummah.

isIn a map that became popular on ISIS media accounts, the Balkans fit under the so-called Orobpa governorate that stretches from parts of Austria to Crimea. This territory stretches further into Europe than any historical claim to Muslim lands would enable it to, but ISIS has a tendency of dreaming big. The source of the map is impossible to track down due to the nature of social media. However, even if it did not come from the ISIS war room itself, its popularity among prominent ISIS supporters on Twitter means that it should not be overlooked. If nothing else, it is an insight into the ideology and far-reaching goals of ISIS supporters

In early June, 2015 ISIS put out its first video specifically geared towards Muslims in the Balkans. Titled “Honor is in Jihād: A Message to the People of the Balkans”, it has that high quality production value that has come to be expected of ISIS, which is assumed to be the result of Western media specialists that have emigrated to join its cause. The introduction of the video takes a glorifying look at the Balkans, both as a geographical region and as a territory that falls under ISIS’s greater vision. “It is a land characterized by the might of mountains that have for centuries been buffeted with fierce battles. Now it has humbled itself to become the new frontier for the Muslims.” Throughout the video, various Bosnian and Albanian mujahedeen make appeals for jihad to their kin in their native languages. They call on others to perform hijrah to ISIS, or to attack the kuffar (offensive term for non-Muslims) in their countries, by any means such as poison or explosives.

jihad

ISIS also gives its interpretation of the history of the Balkans, which is that shortly after Islam took control of the region “darkness marched its way back and the Balkans were transformed from an offensive frontier into a defensive one”. They then speak on the creation of nation states over Muslim lands, specifically ruled by atheist communism within the Balkans, which created a “lifeless air” that will only be removed by “the coming winds of jihad.” The narrator constantly derides the traditional secular nature of the Balkan states and interprets the weakness of Islam in the region as the result of manipulation of the ummah that had been tricked into democracy by “the church of secularism, the UN.”

Still of IS propaganda video
Still of IS propaganda video

Bringing up the breakup of Yugoslavia, one fighter explains how the UN embargo was an attempt to kill all the Muslims as it was implemented when the Christians already had weapons and the Muslims did not. This, of course, oversimplifies the situation, but it also shows the narrow interpretation of Islam versus the world that ISIS and its supporters preach. Another Jihadist directly blames the secular Bosnian government for the massacres that occurred and for betraying the mujahedeen that came to fight in the war. It then calls on Muslims to depose the secular states and take over the region. The video gives conflicting messages, both calling on lone wolf attacks in the Balkans and calling for hijrah. Both fit into ISIS’s greater goals.

Much like anywhere else in the world, ISIS’ calls for lone wolf attacks present a clear danger. Nerdin Ibrić, who perpetrated the shooting at the Zvornik police station in Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina in April, 2015 had ties to a veteran returned from Syria. ISIS supporters could use ethnic tension to attempt to provoke repeats of previous ethnic violence, such as the 2004 Kosovo riots or the 2014 Plovdiv mosque attack in Bulgaria. The history of the region could provide a provocateur with plenty of easy opportunities with potential disastrous results. However, something like foreign fighters coming in to Bulgaria to defend the small group of Muslims over a mosque attack in Plovdiv is probably never going to happen, as it is not the end goal for ISIS. This is especially so now that ISIS is having trouble in its home turf where it has recently lost vital ground and the few fighters that it has exported have been mostly assigned to train groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIS and are actively engaged in conflict, which there are none of in the Balkans.

The risk of a lone wolf attack is very real. A repeat of ethnic or religious violence is an extreme scenario, but one that would have devastating effects on the region, from violent destruction to a simple decline in tourism or foreign investments because of the perceived volatility of the region. Even minor acts of violence that are likely to end in only individual deaths and the maintenance of the status quo could lead to an increase in state repression as a justification to prevent further attacks. This could then be spun by extremists as another attack on their community. Any violence relating to the vaguest of religious tensions and divisions only feeds the ideology that ISIS is trying so hard to promote. Therefore, the possibility of such an attack should not be ignored. Jihadist-inspired domestic attacks have been increasingly common, such as the Sydney cafe hostage situation and the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris. However, it should be noted that there is a fine line between fear mongering and being aware that ISIS poses a clear and present danger in certain countries.

However, it should be noted that there is a fine line between fear mongering and being aware that ISIS poses a clear and palpable danger to certain countries.

 

Countries have attempted to use legislation to prevent the flight of jihadists, but this practice comes with its own complications. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 2178 in September, 2014 which called on countries to do exactly that. In response, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia passed laws criminalizing participation in any foreign armed forces. Albania has proposed a similar law, while Bulgaria criminalized membership in terrorist organizations. For a detailed list of such laws, see the Treatment of Foreign Fighters in Selected Jurisdictions: Country Surveys . While this is a step in the right direction, it has certain complications in regards to the foreign fighters themselves. Those that left knowing the laws might take them into account when deciding to go and fight, but those that are already fighting and may wish to return are faced with the threat of multiple years in prison. They may choose to continue to fight even if they are disillusioned with ISIS and wish to leave the group, which has occurred. This is more likely to result in preventing fighters from returning, rather than its stated purpose of preventing them from leaving. Also, many countries have failed to properly keep track of returned foreign fighters, so the enforcement of these laws is not very effective.

Many analysts have looked at how many fighters are coming into the Syrian conflict (meaning to join ISIS as well as groups like Al Nusra, though ISIS is the main importer of fighters) per total population of exporting countries. This ignores the fact that ISIS is not appealing to the whole of the world but to a particular group that is the whole of some countries while a single digit percentage in others. Looking at country populations as a whole does not enable us to look at which Muslim populations are more susceptible for recruitment than others because it distorts the figures of those populations which are actually being targeted by ISIS. For example, if one compares the 1,859,203 population and 125 foreign fighters of Kosovo to the 62,814,233 population and 1,200 foreign fighters of France, it would show that 0.0067% of Kosovars and only 0.0019% of French people have gone to ISIS. Such statistics have led to inaccurate reports of the Balkans being high exporters of foreign fighters per total population: “When looking at these figures on a per capita basis, Kosovo has 125 foreign fighters for every 1 million citizens, making it the highest ranking country among the 22 listed countries. It is followed by Bosnia with 85, Belgium with 42, and Albania with 30 foreign fighters per million citizens”. Looking at the numbers through ‘Foreign Fighters per Muslim Population’ tells a different story. If you adjust the count to only Muslim populations, Kosovo’s number rises slightly to 0.007%. Meanwhile, France’s number jumps to 0.0239%, nearly 800% higher.*

The numbers for “Foreign Fighters per Muslim Population” show a clear trend. The countries that are the highest exporters per Muslim population are highly developed European democracies, with Belgium being the highest at 0.0702%, followed by Ireland (0.0564%), Denmark (0.0561%), Norway (0.0507%), and Austria (0.0362%) all in the top 5. Only 5 of the top 20 exporters have native Muslim populations (Bosnia and Serbia being the two from the Balkans) as opposed to countries like Ireland whose Muslim population consists mostly of immigrants. On the opposite end of the spectrum are the majority Muslim countries with their own radical Islamic movements that provide domestic opportunities for fighters (such as Afghanistan and Pakistan) which export very few foreign fighters out of their total Muslim population. This suggests that those who wish to go and fight are more likely to do so in their home country. Serbia leads the Balkan exporters with 0.0268% while Bosnia is at 0.0213%. Albania is at 0.0053% and Macedonia is at 0.0017%. The former analysis paints a picture of the Balkans as a radical Islamic community in Europe, while the analysis that takes into account Muslim populations show the Balkan people to be what they have traditionally been, moderates.

The Balkans play an important role for ISIS, which sees them as a buffer and a future battleground. The region already has established networks that can be used to transfer people and to raise support for ISIS. For this reason, the Balkans have been targeted specifically by ISIS propaganda, which threatens significant danger for the region. Governments in the regions should be wary of lone wolf attacks but it seems clear that ISIS’ ideology does not have widespread traction among the peoples of the Balkans when compared to other Muslim populations.

*Note on methodology. For the Muslim population of each country, numbers were taken from the CIA Factbook. For the number of foreign fighters the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation’s most recent numbers report dating from January, 2015 was used. The ICRS has been one of the most reliable sources for counting the foreign fighters, which resulted in them being external advisors for the UN Security Council Resolution 2178. While the numbers are half a year old, they are the best to use for two reasons. One, they use the same methodology for each country, so they are more reliable than using individual news reports to note each country’s statistics. Two, they were published at a time when there were over 20,000 foreign fighters and all countries were counted at the same time, which gives us a large sample size to look at and keeps the analysis consistent in its timeframe. When other major organizations release reports with similar numbers or the ICRS releases a new count, it is important to cross check the findings. It is also important to emphasize that these numbers are by no means perfect. Even the ICRS note that recording each fighter is impossible. However, the consistency from using the same source for both statistics is the best way to ensure that the numbers are an accurate representation of foreign fighter trends.

 

Given the recent history of the Balkans, the idea of Pan-Balkanism or a Balkan state might sound ludicrous. However, the history of the region shows us that this has not always been the case. Because of a shared history and previous global trends, the Balkan nations have undergone various attempts at some form of unification following the demise of the Ottoman empire. These attempts were not successful as the forces of nationalism and imperialism trumped every Pan-Balkanist movement, but they should not be forgotten because they give us a good counterweight to modern fallacies such as deep rooted ethnic hatred and support the dangerous rhetoric of ethnic superiority.

The first of such movements came from the Christian church immediately after the Ottoman empire’s hold on the region started to weaken. During Ottoman rule, Christians were united in the respect that they were second class citizens. The Millet system, in which each religion’s adherents were considered the same caste, ruled all Christians under the Rūm millet or Roman Nation. While the Balkan population was allowed to keep their Christian identity as long as they accepted being second class citizens, the Ottomans suppressed individual ethnic identities.

After Greek independence in 1821, some social forces started to champion Balkan unity. The strongest was the Greek Orthodox church which had grown powerful in the region as the official representative of Balkan Christians. This meant that the upper classes of Balkan Christians were taught in Greek, which spread Greek language and culture throughout the region. This allowed them to create a cohesive identity which was left after the Ottomans left the region. After independence, the Greek Orthodox church wanted to build up the Rūm millet into one new nation headed by the church, but this ran into some problems. Other ethno-centric churches opened throughout the Balkans as different regions gained more and more autonomy, which caused rivalries over authority and followers. This competition led to religion being a divisive force within the Balkans. Another major issue with a religious Pan-Balkan state based off of Orthodox Christianity is that it would have inherently excluded the non-Christians within its borders.

Christianity was not the only force at this time pushing for Balkan unity. Rhigas Feraios was a Greek independence fighter who was also interested in greater Balkan liberation. He is best known for his text “New Political Constitution of the Inhabitants of Rumeli, Asia Minor, the Islands of the Aegean, and the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia” which was an attempt to inspire the Balkans to rise up together, as well as for creating the flag that would later be associated with Balkan unity. The extent of how far the average Greek was interested in the liberation of Bulgarians and Serbians is unknown, but Rhigas is just one example of how the early struggles for independence were not strictly ethnical.

This solidarity over a shared Ottoman rule continued after Rhigas, with various groups working to rid the Balkans of the remains of Ottoman occupation. There were cases like the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, formed in 1893, which fought for Macedonian independence in its earlier years, but later on in its history was very connected to Bulgaria and served Bulgarian interests. Because it worked for liberation with the goal of integrating it into another nation as opposed to self rule, it cannot be seen as an example of Pan-Balkanism.

However, there were multiple other groups which championed Pan-Balkanism. In the early 20th century, many other left leaning groups emerged which were not focused on national interests of individual states but on the liberation of the Balkans as a whole. The Macedonian Secret Revolutionary Committee was one such group. It had strong anarchist leanings and was against nationalism, instead favoring a Balkan Federation much like Feraios. Its main functions were agitating the public against the Ottomans and for the liberation of Macedonia, and its legacy is limited to that.

Shortly after, a more militant group with ties to the MSRC emerged and had far more influence in terms of direct effect on the region. The Boatmen of Thessaloniki (or the Gemidzhiite) used terrorism within Thessaloniki in order to catch the attention of European empires to the region, with the hope of bring attention to the plight of those still living under Ottoman rule. Their short lived bombing campaign ended with no positive effect on the region; Ottoman soldiers massacred many civilians as punishment. This only exacerbated tensions in the region, which shortly after erupted into the Ilinden–Preobrazhenie Uprising.

Some of the Boatmen
Some of the Boatmen of Thessaloniki

There is a debate between Bulgarian and Macedonian scholars about whether the Boatmen were ethnic Bulgarians or Macedonians. If they are seen as ethnic Macedonians, the Pan Balkan motivations behind their actions could be ignored in favor of a national liberation interpretation. However, a few things must be considered.

First, the Boatmen were a very small group. They were not like the IMRO, which controlled a large fighting force interested in liberating and then holding territory. The Boatmen had the ability to join such a group with more resources if their goal was based on ethnic leadership as opposed to adhering to a common ideology they believed in. Instead, the boatmen acted through propaganda of the deed to encourage rebellion against the Ottomans. Second, anarcho-nationalism had a sizable following within the anarchist community during this time. Simply assuming that because they were anarchists they were against nationalism would be imposing modern anarchist thought into their actions from over 100 years ago. However, there were many prominent members of the Balkan anarchist community at the time (such as Tinko Simov, a Bulgarian anarchist who actively fought against the Bulgarian government) that rejected nationalism and ethnic ties in favor of anarchist style autonomy. The majority of the anarchist movement of the time favored anarcho-syndicalism or anarcho-communism, which were worker based movements that disregarded nationalism as a whole unless it could be used as a tool to provoke revolutionary sentiment. Therefore even if we accept the Boatmen were ethnic Macedonians as a fact, this most likely had no major effect on their anarchist ideology. Third, the Boatmen were graduates of the Bulgarian Men’s High School of Thessaloniki, where they were taught by members of the MSCR who strongly supported a Balkan federation and are seen as a major influences on the Boatmen. It is hard to imagine that students taught by strong advocates of Balkan unity and opponents of nationalism would be following a complete opposite form of thought. Therefore the debate of whether the boatmen were Macedonian or Bulgarian is not very relevant, at least for the purposes of Pan-Balkan history. This focuses simply on their actions when the focus should be on the ideology behind their actions, which was removing the last remaining traces of Ottoman rule from the region.

Following these events, the influence of anarchism on the Balkans waned. The next forces to work towards a Balkan federation were the communist, socialist, and agrarian parties of the region. The socialist parties in the Balkans had ties to the Second International, which was an organization formed to create unity between leftist movements beyond borders. This led to more localized attempts at creating cross-border socialist movements, the first major one being the Balkan Socialist Conference in 1910 which openly supported a Balkan Federation. Under their platform, this federation would have even included Turkey because “The Ottoman proletariat is united in agreement with the universal proletariat to fight against war in general” and “Only a Balkan Federation will enable the nations of the Balkans to ensure their total development of culture and political independence.” During the two Balkan wars, the Balkan communist, socialist, and agrarian parties engaged in a powerful anti-war campaign. They were unsuccessful but their effort was connected with a surge in electoral support for each, particularly the socialist parties.

When the first World War came, the Balkan left became very divided. The socialists were split between pro-government socialists who supported their respective nations and the far left socialists who encouraged turning the war into a class war, much like the Bolsheviks. This schism led to a radicalization of politics that Balkan communists most benefited from, resulting in the Balkan Communist Federation which held its first conference in Sofia in January 1920. This culminated in the May Manifesto four years later which promoted establishing a Balkan communist federation, an independent and reunified Macedonian state, and closer ties to the Soviet Union. This schism showed the divide between the moderate socialists against the radical socialists and communists, the former wanted gradual unification between the Balkan states while the latter wanted a complete overthrow of the present governments in order to create a Balkan Socialist Soviet Republic. To make tensions worse, the two sides became bitter rivals over who would be the true voice of the limited recruitment pool of Balkan workers.

The idea of closer ties to the Soviet Union or even a hypothetical Balkan Socialist Soviet Republic state remained for decades as the far left of the time believed in a global, united proletarian which would be needed to advance a global marxist revolution. But had a Balkan Socialist Soviet Republic arisen, its connection to the Soviet Union would have been very problematic. This could have resulted in a Balkan state largely subordinate to Soviet interests as opposed to its own.

Agrarian parties also advocated for a Balkan federation and the creation of a Green International which would have tried to unite farmers and agrarian parties of the world in a way that the Socialist International was able to for socialists.

The Bulgarian agrarian party was in power from 1919 to 1923. Aleksandar Stamboliyski, a strong supporter of Bulgarian integration into Yugoslavia as well as a greater Balkan state, was the Bulgarian prime minister during the agrarian party’s rule. Stamboliyski was famous for identifying not as a Bulgarian but as Yugoslavian during a parliamentary hearing in 1914. He was also arrested for opposing Bulgarian intervention in World War I because he saw Bulgaria’s Serbian front as fratricidal. After being freed, Stamboliyski organized Bulgarian troops and forced King Ferdinand to abdicate the throne, later leading the agrarian party to power in the same year.

The Croatian agrarian party was the second most powerful agrarian party of the region.  The Croatian Peasant Party was founded by Stjepan Radić in 1904. Radić was not originally interested in a Balkan or South Slav union but instead empowering Croatian peasants through land distribution. However, when Yugoslavia was established, he and the party started advocating for a decentralized federation which would expand to Bulgaria, eventually taking in Romania and Greece. For Radić, this was a way of making sure that Yugoslavia did not become Serb dominated. The Slovenian People’s Party of the time agreed with this sentiment, originally supported Slovenian independence, but then shifting to autonomy in and expansion of Yugoslavia in order to have more decentralized power which would ensure Slovenian autonomy within a greater union.

This greater-Serbian/Balkan Federation debate was at the time framed as a “Radić-Stamboliyski against Pašić-Davidović” conflict (Pašić and Davidović being the first two prime ministers of Yugoslavia). It is no wonder that both Radić and Stamboliyski were assassinated, the former by a Serbian nationalist and the latter in a far right coup which included IMRO who saw Stamboliyski as a traitor to Bulgaria for his views on an independent Macedonia. Stamboliyski supported this as a national concession to show his commitment to ending the Bulgarian claims over Macedonia and instead support for a Balkan Federation.

In the 1920s, political repression eventually took the force out of pro-federalization parties who were struggling but still able to maintain relevancy during events such as King Alexander’s dictatorship in Yugoslavia and the white terror in Bulgaria which targeted both communists and agrarians. La Fédération Balkanique was a bimonthly magazine which took up the mantle of promoting a Balkan Federation. It was published from 1924-1931 in all of the Balkan languages, but it did not have the same effects on the region that the former left wing movements held.

La Federation Balkanique
La Federation Balkanique

Though the movement’s leaders were killed, the efforts continued through the first Balkan Conference which was proposed by a former Greek Prime Minister, Alexandros Papanastassiou. Delegates from all over the region met in Athens in October, 1930 and then again in the following year in Istanbul, Romania in 1932, and Thessaloniki in 1933. The first meeting had more to do with theoretical peacebuilding, with agenda items such as utilizing the Hague International Court of Justice and the issue of minorities. The later meetings went further into establishing mutual organizations such as a Balkan postal union and health bureau. These meetings were much more serious than the earlier attempts by socialists and communists as they weren’t hypothetical ‘after the revolution’ plans but instead were attended by the foreign ministers of the Balkan countries, even though they were not empowered to act on behalf of their governments. They were also not organized by leftists, but instead in politicians that saw the practical benefits of a unified and decentralized state. This attempt could be attributed to the fact that the previous decade had many cases cooperation necessary to prevent further conflict, such as the Greco-Bulgarian Agreement of December 9th, 1927 to deal with repayment over confiscated property during population exchanges.

Following this, the Balkan states drifted away from the forces of unity and towards another ‘fratricidal’ period. In 1934, Bulgaria suffered another brief right wing military regime which was soon reversed, but the country remained on track to cement closer ties with the Axis powers. Interestingly enough, some of the forces in this coup were interested in Bulgaria entering Yugoslavia. The Little Entente, a military alliance between Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia fell through in 1937 when Romania and Yugoslavia refused to help Czechoslovakia when it was threatened by Nazi Germany. Italy slowly started to force its influence into Albania following World War I, until the military invasion and resulting occupation of 1939. Greece had suffered from the national schism during World War I which resulted in two coup attempts during the interwar period (one successful in 1922 and one not in 1935) so its foreign policy and support on Balkan integration was shaky and dependent on both internal peace and whoever was in power at the time. Yugoslavia was attacked by Germany in 1941, which resulted in Bulgarian forces occupying part of Yugoslavia in the latter stages of the conflict (particularly Macedonia), which it returned after the war as a token for peace between the two new communist countries.

Following World War II, the communists managed to take power in Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia. However, Yugoslavia soon became suspicious of both the West and the Soviet Union, so it was weary of Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania as they had strong ties to the Soviet Union. Any credible interests of incorporating Bulgaria into Yugoslavia as the last South Slav nation not yet in Yugoslavia died with the Tito-Stalin split. Albania also later left the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence while seeking greater ties with the People’s Republic of China. Greece was stuck in a civil war which ended with an anti-communist regime taking power. The communist regimes in Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia all worked together to assist the communist rebels of Greece, but this cooperation was unsuccessful. This all resulted in a wide variety of interests and ideology clashing in the region, ending the closest the Balkans ever got to a unified federation.

After the cold war, new ideas related to a Balkan state emerged. From a neoliberal perspective, the Balkans are potentially more united they have ever been through membership or possible expansion into the EU. However if one looks at the Schengen Area where European borders are internally eliminated, it is clear that the Balkans and the EU are two very separate entities. Depending on one’s outlook, this can either mean that the Balkans have to continue progress until they are ready to join the EU, or that the Balkans are not yet seen as equals to the rest of the EU.

Map of the Schengen area
Map of the Schengen area

There are some parties in the Balkans, and the rest of the EU, that are opposed to the idea of a European Union, particularly because of the requirements made on the member states and austerity measures that particular countries have accepted. These measures and structural adjustment programs have been compared to requests that the great powers had of their Balkan protectorat states just over 100 years ago which landed the Balkan countries further in debt and at the mercy of the great powers. While it is foolish to think of this as a significant threat to the EU, it is still worth mentioning as certain protest parties, such as EPAM in Greece, are supporters of scrapping the EU in favor of a state with the ability to more directly advocate for the interests of the Balkans.

The prospect of a future Balkan federation is bleak. For one, it would require the end of the EU.  While there is talk of the EU falling apart under economic pressure from its poorer states (particularly Greece) and the current refugee crisis, there is little reason to believe that the EU is going to go away anytime soon.  Similarly, the bloody wars that followed the end of Yugoslavia could be used to claim that the idea would never work. This may be true, but it is worth remembering the fact that the original Balkan Wars were not a barrier to the spread of the original calls to a Balkan federation.